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IV 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COU^T 
STATE OF UTAH, J 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ : 
Respondent, : 
vs. ; 
ONE 1979 PONTIAC TRANS AM, : 
Defendant/Respondent/ : 
Appellant. : 
: Case No. 870494 
: Case No. 870500 
; (Consolidated) 
: Priority 14(b) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The subject Trans Am vehicle was seized and forfeited 
pursuant to the Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utah Code Section 
58-37-13 (1987) . This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal 
under Utah Code Section 78-2-2(3)(i) (1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUft 
1. Can an issue, not raised at trial, be raised for the 
first time on appeal? 
2. Must the subject vehicle be ordered sold, or can it be 
awarded to the seizing agency for drug enforcement purposes, 
subject to that agency's payment of the valid lien(s)? 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The State seized the subject car following the arrest of its 
owner and driver for possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. A petition for forfeiture was filed in the Fifth 
District Court before Judge J. Philip Eves, pursuant to Utah Code 
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Section 58-37-13 (1987). After a hearing, Judge Eves ordered the 
forfeiture of the Trans Am and awarded it to the seizing agency, 
subject to an uncontested first lien in favor of State Bank of 
Southern Utah and a second and disputed lien in favor of Fred J. 
and Bertha Laurito. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 11, 1987, the subject vehicle was seized 
following the arrest of its owner/operator, Wayne T. Hall. 
During a consent search of the vehicle, the Utah Highway Patrol 
Trooper who made the traffic stop and obtained the consent to 
search found a cocaine grinder, scales, several packages of 
cocaine, and some other items of drug paraphernalia (P. 52,55). 
A petition for forfeiture was filed. A hearing was held on 
November 2, 1987 (P. 65) at which the owner/operator Wayne T. 
Hall was present (P. 71). Mr. Hall had, however, failed to 
answer the allegations of the petition and his default was 
entered (P. 71). Mr. Hall did not object to the Courtfs Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law or to the Court's Judgment and 
Order of Forfeiture, although he had actual notice thereof. He 
was present at the hearing and copies of the Findings and 
Judgment were duly served on him (P. 68, 75). 
The Court found the allegations of the Petition to be true, 
fixed the amounts and nature of the interests of claimants State 
Bank and Mr. and Mrs. Laurito, and determined that the seizing 
agencies could use the vehicle in enforcing the controlled 
substances laws, and ordered the property forfeited to those 
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agencies for those^  purposes, subject, however, to the payment of 
said claimants1 interests. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Mr. Hall raises for the first time an issue in this 
appeal vrtiich he failed to raise ir> the lo^jei court, a^ <i this 
Court should not address it. 
2. The lower court did not abuse its discretion, and 
correctly applied the law by awarding the vehicle to the seizing 
agency, subject to payment of lien interests. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT ADDRESS ISSUES FIRST 
RAISED ON APPEAL 
Mr. Hall wa£ personally served with the petition seeking 
forfeiture and notice of the State's intent to forfeit his 
vehicle. He never answered the petitioh and his default was 
entered. He was, however, present in the District Court during 
the hearing on the State's petition. He voiced no objection to 
the State's petition and raised no issues with respect thereto. 
Mr. Hall was also served a copy of the State's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order 
of forfeiture. M£ • Ball did not object tViereto. 
Since Mr. Hall has raised the issue presented by his appeal 
now for the first time, this Court should not address it. Wisden 
v. City of Salina, 709 P.2d 371, 21 Utah Adv. Rep. 20, 21 (1985). 
POINT II 
THE D I S T R I C T COURT P R O P E R L Y AWARDED THE 
VEHICLE TO THE S E I Z I N G AGENCY 
In 1987 t h e L e g i s l a t u r e amended the Cont ro l led Substances 
Act [Utah Code Sect ion 58 -37-13(8 ) (a ) ] to p rov ide : 
Upon a f inding t h a t the s e i z ing agency 
i s ab le to use the f o r f e i t e d p roper ty in the 
en fo rcemen t of c o n t r o l l e d subs tances laws, 
the d i s t r i c t cou r t having j u r i s d i c t i o n over 
t h e c a s e s h a l l award t h e p r o p e r t y t o t h e 
s e i z i n g agency. 
The L e g i s l a t u r e h a s a l s o p r o v i d e d in S e c t i o n 5 8 - 3 7 -
13(1) (e) ( i i i ) t h a t : 
any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a 
bona fide security interest is subject to the 
interest of a secured party . . . 
Mr. Hall, the owner/operator of the subject vehicle, argues 
that since the District Court determined that State Bank and Mr. 
and Mrs. Laurito had security interests in the vehicle the Court 
should have released the vehicle to them pursuant to Section 58-
37-13(9)(j), which provides: 
(j) When the court determines that 
property, in whole or in part, is not subject 
to forfeiture, it shall order release of the 
property to the proper claimant. If the 
court determines that the property is subject 
to forfeiture and release in part, it shall 
order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for 
partial forfeiture and release, the court 
shall order it sold and the proceeds 
distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the 
legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the 
action, including seizure, storage of the 
property, legal costs of filing and pursuing 
the forfeiture, and costs of sale, and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance 
for the General Fund. 
Mr. Hall misconstrues the forfeiture statutes. Those 
statutes provide that persons interested in forfeitable property 
by reason of a security interest therein are protected by 
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subsection 13 (1) (e) ( iii). The statute clearly provides that the 
forfeiture is "subject to" the secured party's interest. The 
District Court properly awarded the car to the seizing agency 
upon specific findings that the agency could use the car in the 
enforcement of the drug laws [as provided in subsection 
13(8) (a)], "subject to" the security interests of State Bank and 
Mr. and Mrs. Laurito. 
Mr. Hall incorrectly assumes that subsection 13(9)(j) 
addresses lien holders. That subsection, properly construed, 
refers to co-owners of the forfeitable prop0rty. 
If the Court adopted Mr. Hall's interpretation of subsection 
13(j), only property "free and clear" of security interests would 
be forfeitable. One of the main purposes of the forfeiture 
statute is to help interdict drug traffickers by subjecting them 
to the loss of their property used to facilitate drug 
trafficking. State v. One Porsche 2-Door, 526 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1974); State v. One 1983 Pontiac, 717 P.2d 1338; 32 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 18 (1986). State v. One 1982 Silver Honda, 735 P.2d 392; 55 
Utah Adv. Rep. 46 (Ct. App. 1987). If only cars without liens 
could be forfeited, less prosperous drug dealers would be 
rewarded. Also, drug dealers could readily circumvent the law 
merely by maintaining a lien against the car. That is not what 
was intended by the Legislature. 
Subsection 13(9)(j) was intended to apply to circumstances 
where the claimant's interest is proprietary. If Mr. Hall was a 
joint or co-owner of the car with another, and that other co-
owner's interest were not forfeitable (such as where he had no 
reasons to know Mr. Hall was transporting cocaine in the 
vehicle), then, under subsection 13(9) (j), the District Court 
would have to determine whether the several proprietary interests 
could be severed. If not, the car would be sold and the proceeds 
distributed as provided in the subsection. 
Inasmuch as Mr. Hall was the sole owner of the car, it was 
entirely forfeitable. There were no other proprietary claimants 
and, therefore, subsection 13(9)(j) is not applicable. 
The District Court properly awarded the car to the seizing 
agency under subsection 13(8)(a) and properly protected the 
interests of the secured parties under subsection 13 (1) (e) (iii) 
by awarding the car "subject to11 said security interests. 
[The State continues to maintain that the District Court 
erred in awarding the car to the agency subject to the security 
interest of Mr. and Mrs. Laurito. See the State's briefs in the 
related appeal, No. 870494.] 
This case illustrates the effectiveness of the forfeiture 
statute: to discourage drug trafficking by allowing the 
forfeiture of the trafficker's vehicle used to transport the 
contraband. Mr. Hall's brief clearly shows his personal interest 
and attachment to the vehicle. (See page 6 of Appellant's 
Brief.) The loss of a desired car used by Mr. Hall to transport 
contraband for distribution is significantly unpleasing to him, 
and hopefully, will have the rehabilitative effect intended by 
the Legislature. 
Mr. Hall also claims a "right" to require a sale of the car, 
"Thus giving him the opportunity to have his obligations to State 
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Bank and Lauritos paid from proceeds of the sale • . ." (page 6 
of Appellant's Brief). The argument is specious. Even assuming 
the Lauritos are entitled to a lien claim against the car, the 
District Court ordered the forfeiture "subject to" the security 
interests of the bank and the Lauritos. Consequently, they will 
be paid and Mr. Hallfs obligations satisfied without the sale. 
Moreover, under the present order, the secured parties do not run 
any risk that the car may not sell for a sufficiently large 
amount to satisfy their liens. Mr. Hall!s claim to a right to 
require a sale of the car so that the liens will be paid is, 
therefore, without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court understood the law applicable to this 
forfeiture and properly applied it to the facts of this case. 
The secured parties were holders of security interests which were 
statutorily and adequately protected by the court's order 
awarding the property to the seizing agency subject to the 
continuing lien interests of the secured parties (assuming the 
validity of the Lauritos1 lien which the State contests). Since 
the banK and the Lauritos were secured parties and not co-owners 
or otherwise claimants of a proprietary interest in the vehicle, 
they were not entitled to an order of nonforfeiture or release. 
That part of the court's order awarding the property to the 
seizing agency without public sale or release to the secured 
parties should be affirmed. 
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